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This paper examines the implications of segmented assets markets for the real and nominal
effects of monetary policy. I develop a model, in which varieties of consumption bundles are
purchased sequentially. Newly injected money thus disseminates slowly through the economy
via second-round effects and induces a non-degenerate, long-lasting heterogeneity in wealth.
As a result, the effective elasticity of substitution differs across households, affecting optimal
markups chosen by producers. In line with empirical evidence, the model predicts a short-term
inﬂation-output trade-off, a liquidity effect, countercyclical markups, and procyclical proﬁts and
wages after monetary shocks.
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Which role does heterogeneity of economic agents play in the transmission of monetary policy?
Standard models of the monetary transmission mechanism use a representative agent and thus ignore
this question. Instead, they implicitly assume that either all agents are affected in the same way by
actions of the monetary authority or that ﬁrms do not pay attention to the potential heterogeneity
of their customer base when setting prices.1 In this paper, I explicitly account for heterogeneity
of ﬁrms and consumers and its implications for monetary non-neutrality. I do so by developing a
heterogeneous-agents model of segmented asset markets and overlapping shopping sequences. The
resulting time-varying distribution of money across agents and its effects on optimal markups turn out
to be important dimensions in the transmission of monetary policy. In addition, a calibrated version
of the model accounts well for the empirically estimated dynamics of output, inﬂation, hours, interest
rates, and proﬁts after a monetary policy shock as well as their volatilities.
Monetary non-neutrality follows from the assumption that agents manage their asset portfolio only
infrequently.2 In the present model, the consumers divide their labor and ﬁnancial income between an
interest-bearing illiquid and a liquid asset, which is needed for purchasing consumption. They acquire
their consumption bundle on shopping trips, visiting one shop after the other. Since consumers
start shopping at different times, their sequences overlap, resulting in a heterogeneous customer
base faced by each shop. In particular, customers at the beginning of their shopping sequence have
a higher elasticity of substitution because they can substitute with more shops further down the
shopping trip. Since the producer cannot price-discriminate, she faces a trade-off between extracting
a higher proﬁt from low-elasticity customers and attracting more high-elasticity customers.3 The
trade-off is altered if the distribution of money holdings in the population changes, affecting the
effective demand elasticity, which in turn gives rise to optimal time-varying markups. Speciﬁcally,
the markup is countercyclical because of the following reason. Monetary injections reach only
those agents currently participating in the asset market. These agents will therefore receive a
higher weight, as they account for a larger share of sales. Since they are in the beginning of their
shopping sequence, this raises the effective elasticity of substitution, leading to a lower markup.
A lower markup implies higher output, such that a short-term inﬂation-output trade-off obtains.
Countercyclical markups are empirically supported by Rotemberg and Woodford (1999). Moreover,
the model predicts countercyclical markups at the ﬁrm level, in line with evidence in the supermarket
industry presented by Chevalier and Scharfstein (1996). These authors also conﬁrm that prices are
strategic complements, as in the present model. Note that because of the sequential structure, the
model predicts an increase in the dispersion of prices after a monetary shock for a ﬁnite elasticity of
substitution, as empirically observed by Balke and Wynne (2007). Additional to the above explained
effect of the wealth distribution on markups, individual labor-supply decisions are also affected.
These heterogeneous labor-leisure trade-offs, created by different wealth levels, can affect aggregate
real variables as well.
The combination of countercyclical markups and a changing, persistent money distribution generates
plausible dynamics of a variety of variables. In order to establish empirical evidence, I estimate the
1Textbook examples of these kind of models are presented in Woodford (2003) and Gal´ ı (2008).
2Jovanovic (1982) derives optimality conditions for this behavior in a general equilibrium model of the Baumol-Tobin
type, while Christiano et al. (1996) provide empirical support.
3This aspect is related to Bils (1989), where a monopolist faces a trade-off between extracting proﬁts from loyal cus-
tomers and attracting new ones.
1second moments and the dynamic responses to a monetary expansion of a range of variables. A
comparison of the model responses to their empirical counterparts shows that the model does well in
reproducing the impulse-response functions and second moments of these variables, once small labor
market frictions are considered. Speciﬁcally, output, inﬂation, labor, wages, proﬁts, and velocity
rise after a monetary contraction, while the interest rate falls, i.e., a liquidity effect is observed. If
a monetary injection reaches all agents, keeping the staggered bank visits, hump-shaped responses
are obtained. Standard models of the monetary transmission mechanism have difﬁculties generating
these responses.4
If monetary injections reach all agents simultaneously, the wealth distribution remains unaffected
and real variables are not affected by monetary policy. Hence, a heterogeneous wealth distribution is
crucial for monetary non-neutrality in the model. If the number of goods in the consumption bundle
moves towards inﬁnity, markups are constant as the weight of each good approaches zero. Similarly,
if the elasticity of substitution reaches inﬁnity, the markup is constant at unity. While in the ﬁrst case
the heterogeneous labor-supply decisions affect the price distribution and aggregate real variables,
the latter case of perfect competition implies equal prices among all ﬁrms. The individual differences
in the labor supply cancel in the aggregate, leaving real variables unaffected. The model therefore
nests the cases of a constant markup and ﬁxed exogenous output. In both cases, the liquidity effect is
still present.
Models of segmented asset markets in which only a part of the population participates in an
open-market operation of the central bank go back to Grossman and Weiss (1983), who develop
a Baumol-Tobin-type model of staggered money withdrawals. Subsequent work along these lines
focuses on the implications for ﬁnancial variables. Alvarez and Atkeson (1997) show that such
a model of segmented asset markets can generate volatile and persistent real as well as nominal
exchange rates. In a similar model of a closed-economy, Alvarez et al. (2009) examine the dynamics
of money, velocity, and prices. Alvarez et al. (2002) develop a model of endogenous asset market
segmentation and ﬁnd plausible implications for interest rates, expected inﬂation and exchange
rates. Occhino (2004) uses a model where a part of the population is constantly excluded from asset
trading, and studies the implications for money and interest rates. Common to these models is the
exogeneity of output. An exception is Rotemberg (1984), who combines segmented asset markets
with production based on capital and a ﬁxed labor supply. He ﬁnds that after a monetary expansion,
output increases and returns slowly to the steady state. However, because of perfect competition,
the optimal markup is not considered. This implies that ﬁrms continue to ignore the potentially
heterogeneous composition of their customer base. The effects of a changing wealth distribution on
labor supply are ruled out out by assumption.
The implications of heterogeneous agents for price setting and labor-supply decisions were often
neglected because of complicated wealth effects that arise after monetary injections, which affect
only a part of the population. One solution to this problem was proposed by Lucas (1990). In his
model, the economy consists of families that pool their resources at the end of the period. A large
body of literature uses this approach to build and simulate models of the transmission of monetary
policy, including Fuerst (1992) and Christiano et al. (1997). While tractability is reached with this
method, the heterogeneity of money holdings is limited to the period of the shock, eliminating
longer-lasting wealth effects. Similarly, Alvarez et al. (2009) remove wealth effects by allowing for
4See, among others, Christiano et al. (1997) and Gal´ ı (2003).
2trade in a complete set of state-contingent assets. However, as also argued by Menzio et al. (2009) in
the context of a search model of money, long-lasting non-degenerate wealth distributions can have
potentially important effects. In the present model, tractability is reached despite unrestricted money
distributions by an ownership structure of shops that leads to a slow dissemination of newly injected
money throughout the economy. This mechanism gives rise to persistent effects of monetary shocks
due to second-round effects and long-lasting changes in the wealth distribution. Because over time
all agents in the economy beneﬁt from the monetary injection via increased proﬁts and wages, the
wealth distribution returns to its pre-shock level in the long run, thereby guaranteeing stationarity.
Hence, the model can be analyzed with standard tools for the simulation of dynamic stochastic
general equilibrium models.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. The model is developed in section 2. I calculate
empirical impulse-response functions and second moments in section 3, and compare them to predic-
tions of the model in section 4. Section 5 concludes the paper, while the appendix shows additional
impulse-response functions and lists data sources.
2 A model of sequential purchases
Standard models of monopolistic competition assume that each agent is consuming an inﬁnite number
of different varieties. Furthermore, although one period is assumed to be of considerable length, all
actions of the agents are done simultaneously, including buying the varieties. If one is to relax these
assumptions, important changes for strategic interaction and price setting will emerge. To account for
these points, I introduce shopping sequences similar to Grossman and Weiss (1983) and Rotemberg
(1984). Instead of visiting all shops simultaneously, the consumers visit one shop after the other. The
number of shops visited is ﬁnite.5 Note that this does not imply that the total number of shops in the
economy is ﬁnite, but merely that each consumer spends a positive amount on each good. After hav-
ing acquired all goods which enter the consumption bundle, the consumer aggregates and consumes
this bundle at home. As in standard models, it takes the length of one period to buy a complete bundle.
Before starting their shopping sequences, consumers visit the bank, where they have access to their
account. All income from labor and dividends up to this point are paid to the account. At the
bank, agents can participate without costs in the asset market, dividing their wealth in liquid and
interest-bearing illiquid assets.6 As in, e.g., Grossman and Weiss (1983) and Alvarez et al. (2002),
only those agents currently participating in the asset market receive monetary injections from the
central bank. After having settled their ﬁnancial transactions, consumers start a new shopping
sequence, using the liquid assets for payments. Each consumer works in the last shop of her
shopping sequence, receiving wage income on her bank account.7 In addition, the consumer owns the
shares of the same shop, such that the corresponding proﬁts also get paid to her account. After hav-
ing worked, the consumer visits the bank, has access to her income, and the sequence starts over again.
5The case of a ﬁnite number of varieties was already discussed by Dixit and Stiglitz (1977).
6For the results it does not matter if the liquid asset also yields some return. In the linearized version of the model it is
only important that the illiquid asset dominates the liquid asset in the rate of return.
7Alternatively, one could assume that the consumer works in the ﬁrst shop of the sequence. While this adds an additional
channel of internal propagation to the model, it has the disadvantage of assuming that considerable time passes until the
agents have access to their wage income, which was transferred to their accounts.
3If it takes some time to acquire a consumption bundle, it is unlikely that all consumers start and ﬁnish
their shopping sequences and adjust their ﬁnancial assets at the same dates. I therefore assume that
the above explained sequence starts at different points in time for each consumer. Speciﬁcally, there
are n consumers—or n types of consumers—in the economy, each of which is at a different stage of
her sequence. All consumers visit a particular shop at the same time, where the shop cannot price
discriminate. This assumption has the advantage that from the the shops’ perspective, the setup is
equivalent to an economy with a representative consumer and uncertainty about the current stage of
the shopping sequence of this consumer. The timing of the model is visualized in ﬁgure 1 for n = 3.
One shop after the other is serving all consumers, while in between the visits there is always one
agent consuming the bundle and passing by the bank, and another one is working for the next shop.
Heterogeneity of agents arises endogenously because of the different points in time when the agents
visit the asset market, resulting in potentially different money holdings and labor-leisure trade-offs.
As visible in the ﬁgure, I make the following assumptions regarding the timing of information in be-
tween the visits to two subsequent shops. First, one of the agents is consuming her bundle—acquired
over the course of the last shopping sequence—visits the bank and participates in the asset market,
where she receives a potential monetary injection. The amount of this injection is instantaneously
common knowledge to all agents in the model. The agent divides her assets in liquid and illiquid
assets, and leaves the bank. The shop that is going to be visited next subsequently produces goods
using labor input of the agent with the next higher index, sets its price and sells the produced goods to
the customers. Since the shop owner is free to adjust prices and no new information arrives between
production, price setting, and sales, only the amount demanded will be produced. Concerning
notation, agents are ordered such that the agent with index i starts her shopping sequence at the shop
with index j = i.
Shop 1 Shop 2 Shop 3
Shop 1 Shop 2 Shop 3


























Figure 1: Timing of the model. Notes: ’Shop j’ denotes purchases at shop j, ’Bank’ the participation in
the asset market. ’Cons.’ stands for consumption of the previously bought bundle, while arrows depict the
transfer of income from labor and business activity to the account of the respective agent. Thick lines represent
shopping sequences.
42.1 Setup
Households Agent i maximizes her expected value of lifetime utility, which depends positively on
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γ > 1  (2)
with Ci t(j) being the consumption of agent i of good j. If the consumer happens to start her
shopping sequence at the beginning of a period, she acquires the complete consumption bundle
in the course of a single period and consumes in the beginning of the next period. This is the
case for agent 1 only, who is the ﬁrst in the period to visit the bank and start shopping. The other
agents started somewhere in the middle of last period and consume this period. This implies that
they buy a speciﬁc good j either in period t−1or t. The period changes between shop j = n and j = 1.
While being at the bank, i.e., after having visited shop j = i−1 (shop j = n for agent i = 1), the
agent has access to her account. Her nominal labor income Wi tLi t, a ﬁxed cost of production φ, and
the dividends Πi t of the shop of which she owns the shares have been transferred to this account.9
Furthermore, she can participate in the asset market, i.e., divide her assets into illiquid assets Bi t
(bonds etc.) and liquid assets M
j
i t (money/checking account). M
j
i t ≥ 0 denotes agent i’s holdings of
the liquid asset after having acquired good j. Hence, after having used the liquid asset for shopping
in her ﬁrst shop after the bank, an amount of Mi
i t remains. The illiquid assets from last period pay
the amount (1 + ri t)Bi t. Finally, the agent may also receive a monetary injection Si t. The budget
constraint of the agent who participates in the asset market (i=j) is therefore
M
j
i t + Bi t+1 + Pt(j)Ci t(j) = (1 + ri t)Bi t + Πi t + Wi tLi t + φ + Si t + M
j−1
i t i = j  (3)
The liquid asset can then be used for purchasing consumption. During the shopping sequence the
agent has to obey a series of cash-in-advance constraints
M
j
i t + Pt(j)Ci t(j) = M
j−1
i t i  = j  (4)
with M0
i t ≡ Mn
i t−1 
If a change of period lies between two visits of shops, the time index of the liquid asset changes, as
described in the last equation. I solve the model under the assumption that all liquid assets are spent
during the shopping sequence, i.e., Mi−1
i t = 0 10 As, e.g., Grossman and Weiss (1983), Rotemberg
(1984), and Alvarez et al. (2009), I make the assumption that inter-household borrowing and lending
is not possible. This would contradict the structure of the model, in which consumers are not visiting
the bank during their shopping sequence. Hence, consumers currently at the bank do not engage in
borrowing and lending with the consumers not at the bank.
8For a discussion of the properties (including balanced growth) of this kind of utility functions, see King et al. (1988).
9In this setup, the ﬁxed cost can be interpreted as a base salary for the worker.








i  = 1 
5Shops Producer j maximizes the proﬁt function
Πt(j) = Yt(j)Pt(j) − Wt(j)Lt(j) 
where the wage can differ across ﬁrms because each shop employs a different worker. However, the
shop takes the wage as given, i.e., each worker stands for a continuum of workers of the same type,
just as each consumer could stand for a continuum of consumers of the same type. The maximization
problem is subject to a production function that features labor as the sole input
Yt(j) = AtLt(j) − φ 
where φ represents the ﬁxed cost of production, see Christiano et al. (1997). The technology level At
is common to all ﬁrms.
Monetary authority The central bank controls the money supply. It does so by setting the monetary
injections St according to a money growth rule
St = ηsSt−1 + ǫt  (5)
which is the same as specifying a movement of the total money stock Mt according to
∆Mt = ηs∆Mt−1 + ǫt 
I assume that the central bank injects money only at the beginning of the period. This simpliﬁes the
exposition since no shocks occur in the course of the period, allowing me to use the expectational
operator for agents’ expectations based on the common information set of one period. In the baseline
scenario I assume that the complete injection is transferred to the account of the agent who starts
her shopping sequence at the beginning of the period, i.e., S1 t = St and Si t = 0 ;∀ i  = 1. As a
sensitivity analysis, I also consider the case of an equal transfer to the accounts of all agents in the
economy, i.e., Si t = St n ∀ i. This implies that all agents beneﬁt from the monetary injection but
access it at different points in time, namely when visiting the bank.
In equilibrium, the money stock Mt has to equal money demand by the households in each moment






Timing and ownership structure As described above, each agent receives dividends from the shop
where she has worked and shopped before entering the bank, i.e., agent i receives her wage and proﬁts
from shop i−1. In addition, she also receives the ﬁxed cost φ. Since dividends and wages are paid on
the account before the worker has access to the account, the time index changes if the period ends in
with a corresponding restriction for i = 1.The individual price index Pi of a consumption bundle is deﬁned via PiCi =  
j Pi(j)Ci(j). In order to support the above assumption, I check that this condition is fulﬁlled for each agent in all
shopping sequences when calculating impulse-response functions or second moments in section 4. A similar approach is
used by Alvarez et al. (2009). Under normal circumstances, this inequality is always satisﬁed, since it is clearly not optimal
to carry over non-interest bearing liquid asset holdings between visits to the bank. In times of high deﬂation, e.g. due to a
strong negative demand shock, agents would postpone their consumption. Hence, the model would endogenously generate
a liquidity trap. I do not consider this kind of shocks in the present paper, but leave this possibility for future research.
6between. This is the case for agent 1, who receives the proﬁts of shop n. Hence in terms of notation
we have
Πi t = Πt(i−1) i  = 1 Π1 t = Πt−1(n) 
For the same reason
Wi t = Wt(i−1) i  = 1 W1 t = Wt−1(n) 
Li t = Lt(i−1) i  = 1 L1 t = Lt−1(n) 
2.2 First-order conditions
Due to the different timing assumptions, some differences in the ﬁrst-order conditions arise relative
to a standard model. Notably, the consumers are heterogeneous with respect to their money holdings,
which changes the effective elasticity of substitution faced by the producers. Furthermore, strategic
interaction exists because each consumer buys at a ﬁnite number of shops. Due to this different
consumption behavior, price setting of ﬁrms is also affected.
Households While being at the bank, each agent has to decide how much of the liquid asset to hold
for the next shopping sequence, and how much to invest into the illiquid asset for saving, resulting in
a bond Euler equation.







The expected marginal utility of consumption is
λi t+1 = EtC−σ
i t+1(1 − Li t+1) (1−σ) 
Note that the agent decides on holdings of the liquid asset that she is then using for shopping, resulting
in consumption in the following period. The ﬁrst-order condition concerning the labor-leisure trade-
off is
 C1−σ






where the left hand side is the marginal disutility of working, and the future price level enters because
today’s wage can only be used for the coming shopping sequence.















where, because of the possible change of period between buying and consuming,
Ci t ≡ Ci t+1 if j ≥ i in (7) 
Ci t ≡ Ci t if j < i in (7) 






7renders the solution by backward-induction straightforward. The time-varying variable Ψi t(j) is
responsible for a non-constant elasticity of substitution, and can be interpreted as the price level for
the remaining goods in the sequence, adjusted for the cash-in-advance constraint.11 It is deﬁned as







Pt(j+1) j  = i−1  (9)











γ j = i−1 
Equations (7) and (9) imply
Et[Ψi t(j)−1] = Et[Ψi t(j + 1)−1] j  = i−1 
Shops Since shopping periods overlap, the shops face consumers in different stages of their shop-





Ci t(j)  (10)
The ﬁrst-order condition for the producer is then
∂Yt(j)
∂Pt(j)
[MCt(j) − Pt(j)] = Yt(j) 















κi t(j) ≡ ϕC
i t(j) − ϕΨ
i t(j) 
where ϕC
i t(j) and ϕΨ
i t(j) denote the elasticities of Et(C
1 γ
i t ) and Et(Ψi t(j)−1) with respect to
Pt(j), respectively. The effective elasticity of substitution ηt(j) faced by shop j is hence composed
of the standard term γ and an average of individual terms, weighted by their consumption shares.
The optimal markup is higher relative to the standard case of inﬁnitely many goods. Note that as in
standard models the ﬁrm is taking household expectations about future prices as given, i.e., a single
ﬁrm does not assume that its price setting affects future prices. The implications of the above pricing
rule are discussed in the following.








j  = i − 1 
For j = i−1 it merely reﬂects the cash-in-advance constraint.
82.3 The inﬂation-output trade-off
The inﬂation-output trade-off relies on a varying wealth distribution, created by the limited par-
ticipation in asset markets. If a monetary injection reaches all agents—independently if they are
currently at the bank or not—in a way that the money distribution is merely shifted upwards, nominal
variables jump to a higher level while real variables are not affected. This can be seen by multiplying
all nominal variables above, including the cash-in-advance constraints (4) of agents currently not
trading, with a ﬁxed scalar (observing that in equilibrium B = 0).
Monetary policy under limited participation affects real variables in two different ways. On the
household’s side, a monetary shock affects the wealth distribution, thereby changing individual
labor-leisure decisions. Hence, real variables can be altered via heterogeneous labor supply decisions.
On the ﬁrm’s side, a monetary shock inﬂuences the markup (which corresponds to the inverse
of real marginal costs) in the following way. For a ﬁnite n, consumers at the beginning of their
shopping sequence have a higher elasticity of substitution—a higher κi t(j) in absolute terms—than
the consumers further down the sequence. Hence, when setting its price, the ﬁrm faces a trade-off
between extracting more proﬁts from the customers with a low elasticity, and loosing proﬁts from the
customers at the beginning of the sequence, who might substitute to shops that come later in the row.
Since the consumers at the beginning of their shopping sequence are the ones that have beneﬁted
from a monetary injection, their weight in ηt(j) increases, leading to a countercyclical markup after
expansionary monetary shocks. A countercyclical markup is important for achieving procyclical
marginal costs (wages), and a dampened initial inﬂation response.
For n→∞the terms ϕC
i t(j) and ϕΨ
i t(j)→0, since the weight of each variety in the bundle approaches
zero, see equation (2). This implies that decisions on the consumption of a particular variety have
no effect on the value of the bundle (ﬁrst term), nor on the resources available for acquiring other
varieties (second term). Hence, n → ∞ implies κi t(j) → 0 and a constant markup. For γ → ∞,
the variable ηt(j) approaches inﬁnity. The markup reaches unity, reﬂecting perfect competition.
Thus, in both cases, n → ∞ and γ → ∞, the markup is constant. With this transmission channel
missing, monetary policy can have an effect on real variables only via the heterogeneous labor supply
decisions. In the latter case of γ → ∞, however, perfect competition leads to equal prices among
all ﬁrms, thereby eliminating any impact of heterogeneous labor supplies on the distribution of ﬁnal
goods prices. With prices being the same for all producers, changes in demand are only due to wealth
effects and the impact of labor supply on the marginal utility of consumption. In the linearized model
these effects cancel in the aggregate, such that aggregate real variables are unaffected by monetary
policy under perfect competition. Hence, the model nests the case of exogenously given output, used
in earlier papers mentioned in the introduction. Note that under both scenarios, n→∞ and γ →∞,
the dispersion of money holdings still prevails. In particular, since only few agents participate in
the asset market at the time of the monetary injection, the basic limited participation mechanism is
effective, yielding a liquidity effect.12
Pre-set wages I will also consider the case of labor market frictions, as proposed by Erceg et al.
(2000) and suggested by Christiano et al. (1997) for enhancing the empirical success of limited par-
ticipation models. Assuming that the ﬁrst ξn shops after a monetary injection cannot re-negotiate their
12Impulse-response functions for both discussed cases are available upon request.




AtPt(j) j = 1     ξn 
Due to the higher proﬁts at the time of the shock under pre-set wages, a stronger output responses is
generated because of the muted response of marginal costs. If I assume pre-set real instead of nominal






At j = 1     ξr 
with ξr denoting the number of shops that cannot change their real wages after a monetary shock.
Pre-set real wages alone do not generate monetary non-neutrality. I.e., as under ﬂexible wages, si-
multaneous monetary transfers to all agents in the economy—independently if they are currently at
the bank or not—lead to an increase in the price level without any real effects since no heterogeneous
wealth levels arise. I will therefore use the case of pre-set real wages in order to isolate the effects of
the sequential structure in section 4.
2.4 Aggregation
Aggregation concerns the question how to derive aggregate variables from the heterogeneous agents
in the model. Aggregate output is deﬁned as the sum of this variable over all producers in one period.
Since there is no government nor investment, consumption equals output. Note that by this convention
aggregate consumption is not the consumption bundle but real consumption expenditure, as in ofﬁcial
statistics. Concerning wages, prices, marginal costs, labor, proﬁts, and the markup, I use averages
over all producers in one period. All these variables are counted in the period when production
takes place. Since the agents participate in the asset market at different times in one period, they are
offered potentially different interest rates. The aggregate interest rate is deﬁned as the average. The
total money supply is the total amount of the liquid asset in the economy at the end of the period.14
Velocity can then be calculated given aggregate output, the price level, and the money supply.
2.5 Steady state
The steady state is characterized by a ﬁxed money stock and a constant technology level. Since these
are the only exogenous driving forces in the model, all other variables are also constant. The only
steady-state variable that will play a role later on (in the calibration section) is the velocity of money.
Because n measures the total number of bank visits of all agents during one period, velocity depends
on this parameter. In any moment of time there is one agent in each stage of the shopping sequence.
Money held by the agent in the last shop of her sequence, Mi−2, divided by the steady-state price
level equals per capita consumption per shop, see equation (8). Total output is per capita output per





13Blanchard and Gal´ ı (2007) discuss extensively the case of sticky real wages.
14This ensures comparability with the data, which measures also the end-of-period money stock.
10where variables without time and agent subscripts denote steady-state values. To relate Mi−2 to the
























In order to demonstrate the basic mechanics of the model, appendix A shows a simulation for the case
of ﬂexible wages and two agents visiting the bank in each period. Section 4 brings the model to the
data by using plausible values for wage stickiness and the number of bank visits. Before simulating
the model, empirical evidence is established in the next section.
3 Empirical evidence
To compare the predictions of the model to their empirical counterparts, I calculate impulse-response
functions to monetary shocks and conditional second moments based on time series for the United
States.
3.1 Data and estimation procedure
The series employed are the log of the gross domestic product (GDP), the change in the log of the
personal consumption expenditure deﬂator (Inﬂation), corporate proﬁts of non-ﬁnancial ﬁrms, hours
worked, real wages, unit labor costs, real wages, velocity, M1, and the the federal funds rate (FFR).
Following Clarida et al. (2000), the data start in 1979Q3, the date when Paul Volcker was appointed
chairman of the Fed, and run through 2008Q3. For sources and details of the data, see appendix B.15
The identiﬁcation scheme follows standard techniques. Speciﬁcally, I estimate a VAR of the form
A(L)Yt = ǫt 
where A(L) denotes a matrix polynominal in the lag operator L. A constant and a linear trend is













Identiﬁcation is achieved by the assumption that a change in the federal funds rate has no impact on
real variables in the same quarter. This implies that A(0) is lower-triangular and the interest rate is
ordered last, or second-to-last if M1 or velocity are included. See Christiano et al. (1996) for further
details. In order to economize on the degrees of freedom, I re-estimate the VAR ﬁve more times,
replacing in turn proﬁts with the logs of hours, real unit labor costs, real wages, velocity, and the
monetary base. Re-assuringly, the responses of the ﬁxed three variables do not change signiﬁcantly.
15I use the PCE deﬂator instead of the GDP deﬂator since inﬂation in the model refers to inﬂation of consumer expendi-
ture. Furthermore, usage of this variable prevents the so called prize puzzle.
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Figure 2: Empirical responses to an unanticipated expansionary monetary policy shock at t=0. Notes:
Solid line: point estimate. Dashed lines: bootstrapped 90% conﬁdence intervals based on 1000 replications.
Horizontal axis denotes quarters, vertical axis shows log deviations. For description of the data, see appendix
B.
3.2 Impulse-response functions
The estimated responses of the variables under consideration are plotted in ﬁgure 2. Dashed lines
represent bootstrapped 90% conﬁdence intervals based on 1000 replications. The results are in line
with established views in the literature.16 After an unexpected fall in the federal funds rate of 100 ba-
sis points, output, inﬂation, hours worked, unit labor costs, velocity, M1, and proﬁts increase. While
inﬂation and output rise by around the same amount, real wages increase by much less. The ﬁnd-
ing of an increase in the monetary base after a fall in the interest rate documents a liquidity effect.
As discussed in Christiano et al. (1997), rising proﬁts constitute a problem for standard sticky-price
models.
3.3 Counterfactual second moments
Additional to the presented impulse-response functions I am also interested in the second moments
of the data, in order to compare them to the predictions of the model in section 4.4. Speciﬁcally,
since the model is designed to explain effects of monetary policy shocks, I calculate second moments
based on counterfactual time series that would have been observed if monetary policy shocks had
been the only source of ﬂuctuations. To this end, the above identiﬁed monetary policy shocks are
fed back into the estimated VAR system (i.e., the respective A0’s until A4’s for each of the estimated
systems), shutting off all other shocks.17 Conditional second moments can be calculated based on
the resulting time series. Note that since the model is calibrated to annual data, I ﬁrst annualize the
16See Christiano et al. (1997), who report similar ﬁndings for the responses of output, inﬂation, interest rates, wages, and
proﬁts. Altig et al. (2005) also include velocity, yielding almost the same picture.
17As starting values I employ hypothetical trending values of the variables that would occur if no shocks had happened at
all, instead of historical values. By this, it is guaranteed that a zero shock variance leads to a zero variance of the variables.
12Statistic Empirical Values Theoretical Values
Std. Dev. Output 0 52
(0 18)
0.50
Std. Dev. Inﬂ. 0 22
(0 19)
0.36
Std. Dev. Velocity 0 94
(0 34)
0.58
Std. Dev. Hours 0 41
(0 20)
0.44
Std. Dev. Wage 0 32
(0 14)
0.002
Std. Dev. Proﬁts 4 54
(1 56)
1.47
Std. Dev. FFR 0 78
(0 16)
0.21
Std. Dev. M1 Growth 0 62
(0 12)
0.62
Table 1: Empirical and theoretical business cycle statistics in percent. Notes: Empirical values: counter-
factual time series based on identiﬁed monetary shocks only; theoretical values: averages of 1000 simulations
of the model. All series were HP-ﬁltered with a smoothing coefﬁcient of 100. Standard deviations are given in
parenthesis.
data by taking averages over four quarters.18 The annualized time series are then HP-ﬁltered with a
smoothing parameter of 100, see Hodrick and Prescott (1997). The results are presented in the left
column of table 1. Note that because of the annualization of the data, the results differ relative to
studies based on higher frequency data.
4 Simulation
After having established empirical evidence, I compute the impulse-response functions of the model
as well as its theoretical second moments and compare them to their empirical counterparts. In order
to do so, I linearize the model around its symmetric (and unique) non-stochastic steady state and solve
the resulting system of linear equations using standard techniques.
4.1 Calibration
The baseline parameters used for the simulation of the model are summarized in table 2. The elas-
ticity of substitution between the varieties γ is chosen such that the markup in steady state is 20%,
see Rotemberg and Woodford (1993).19 Different values are used in the literature for the coefﬁcient
of relative risk aversion σ. Basu and Kimball (2002) report empirical ﬁndings for its inverse, the in-
tertemporal elasticity of substitution, ranging from 0.2-0.75. The Frisch elasticity of labor supply was
estimated between 1/3 and 1/2 by Domeij and Flod´ en (2006). I choose a parameter constellation in
the baseline calibration with σ = 3 and a Frisch elasticity of 1/2 (  = 0 65). Later in this section I
conduct a robustness check regarding these parameter, employing 2 and 5 for σ and 1/3 for the Frisch
elasticity. The ﬁxed cost is set such that the steady-state proﬁt share corresponds to the empirical av-
18The quarterly data were already expressed in annualized values.
19Rotemberg and Woodford (1993) report values between 20% and 40%. Due to the ﬁnite number of goods in the
consumption bundle, the monopoly power of ﬁrms for a given γ is higher relative to the case of inﬁnitely many goods. With
inﬁnitely many goods the markup that corresponds to the chosen γ would be 15%.
13Parameter Value Calibration Target Value
Intratemporal elasticity of subst. γ 7.51 SS Markup 20.0%
Coefﬁcient of rel. risk aversion σ 3 Intertemp. elasticity of subst. 1/3
Weight on leisure   0.65 Frisch Elasticity 1/2
Fixed costs φ 0.019 Proﬁt share 5.5%
Discount factor β 0.96 SS interest rate 4%
Total # visits to the bank n 14 Average velocity 1.87
Autocorrelation of money shock ρM 0 344 Quarterly autocorrelation 0 34
Wage stickiness ξn 3 Time until 50% of all shops adjust 1.14 Q.
Table 2: Baseline calibration of the model
erage of 5 5% over the sample period.20 Concerning the length of one period, I follow Alvarez et al.
(2009) and use one year.21 The latter authors refer to Vissing-Jorgensen (2003), who shows that
around 1/2 to 1/3 of households trade in asset markets in a given year, which would correspond to
even longer periods of 2-3 years. Christiano et al. (1996) ﬁnd that households’ assets do not change
signiﬁcantly for one year after a monetary policy shock, such that the choice of one year seems appro-
priate. The discount factor is therefore set to 0.96, implying an annual steady-state interest rate of four
percent. The parameter n determines how often the bank is visited by different agents in one period,
and governs therefore velocity. Choosing n = 14 implies, according to equation (12), a steady-state
velocity of 1.87, corresponding to the mean over the empirical sample. The money growth rate after
a monetary policy shock is estimated in the VAR model of section 3 to be 0.34 in quarterly terms,
implying an annual value for ρM of 0 344 since the model does not allow for intra-period injections.22
Concerning the degree of wage stickiness, a large body of literature employs a Calvo-lottery scheme
for generating a slow adjustment of wages. The values used for the corresponding Calvo parameter
range from the estimates of 0.64 in Christiano et al. (2005) and 0.72 in Altig et al. (2005) to the value
of 0.75 in Erceg et al. (2000). I convert them to pre-set wages along the following thought. During
the time of pre-set wages, ﬁrms cannot adjust at all, while afterwards ﬁrms are free to adjust fully.
I therefore set the length of the pre-set wage period such that it corresponds to the time when half
of the price setters can adjust after a shock in a Calvo-style model. With a Calvo parameter of 0.7,
this period is around one quarter.23 I will therefore consider a small friction of nominal wages being
pre-set for slightly below one quarter. With n = 14 this implies ξn = 3, i.e., the ﬁrst four shops in the
period cannot change their nominal wage after a monetary injection. Furthermore, I will use ξn = 4
as a robustness check, such that wages are pre-set slightly above one quarter, as well as ξr = 3 for a
further investigation of the model’s mechanics.
20Again, see the appendix for data and their sources.
21Alvarez et al. (2009) use values between 11 and 38 for their variable N, assuming that each month a fraction 1 N of
households are active in the asset market. In the present model, each household participates in the asset market in every
period. This implies that one period has a length of N months.
22The responses do not change if alternatively each agent receives a monetary injection of 0.34 times the injection that
was received by the agent who visited the bank last. Only dispersions increase somewhat. However, notation would become
more cumbersome with intra-period money injections.
23Letting ξ
C denote the quarterly Calvo parameter, a fraction of 1 − ξ
C adjust in the period of the shock. One quarter
later, this fraction reaches (1 − ξ
C)(1 + ξ
C), which is 1 2 for ξ
C = 0 707
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Figure 3: Effects of different wage rigidities. Theoretical responses to an unanticipated expansionary
monetary policy shock at t=0. Black solid lines: nominal wages set in advance for three shops. Red
dashed-dotted lines: nominal wages set in advance for four shops. Blue dashed lines: real wages set
in advance for three shops. Notes: Horizontal axis denotes quarters, vertical axis shows log deviations from
steady state.
4.2 Impulse-response functions
Figure 3 shows the theoretical responses to an unanticipated, positive shock to the total money
supply of 0 5%, corresponding to the observed change in the ﬁrst period of the money stock after
an expansionary shock in section 3. As described in the previous section, I consider several cases
for the labor market frictions. The baseline calibration with ξn =3 (wages pre-set for 0.86 quarters)
is plotted with the solid black line. A longer duration of ξn = 4 (wages pre-set for 1.14 quarters) is
depicted by the red dashed-dotted line. The resulting impulse-responses functions are quite similar.
In order to isolate the effect of asset market segmentation I also explore the case of pre-set real wages,
as discussed in section 2. The corresponding impulse-response functions for ξr =3 are plotted with
blue dashed lines in the same ﬁgure. While pre-set nominal wages create another channel through
which monetary policy can affect labor supply, this is not the case for pre-set real wages. The latter
friction alone does not create monetary non-neutrality. Combined with the sequential structure of the
model, however, a signiﬁcant inﬂation-output trade-off is created.
After the increase in the money stock, a dispersion of money holding arises, which gives rise to a
falling markup, as discussed in section 2. A lower markup prevents prices to move one-for-one with
the money stock, thereby increasing demand. This reaction in sales increases proﬁts, despite the
falling markup. Real wages increase by a small amount. Agents who did not receive the injection
increase their labor supply because of a negative wealth effect stemming from higher nominal prices,
adding to the positive output response. The increased money supply depresses interest rates because
agents currently at the bank have to be induced to hold more money, creating a liquidity effect. In
the model, output equals consumption. Lacking direct data on the markup, this variable cannot be
compared to empirical observations.
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Figure 4: Theoretical responses of dispersion to an unanticipated expansionary monetary policy shock
at t=0. For description of different line colors see ﬁgure 3. Notes: Horizontal axis denotes quarters,
vertical axis shows standard deviations of percentage deviations from steady state for individual agents.
Comparing ﬁgures 2 and 3 shows that the model with small labor market frictions performs quite
well in replicating the empirical responses. Output, inﬂation, proﬁts, and hours increase by around
the same amount as found in the data. Also velocity rises by an empirical plausible value, without
the initial fall. An exception is the real wage, which responds much too little in the model compared
with the point estimate in section 3. However, the estimated conﬁdence intervals are very wide and
include the theoretical response. Also the interest rate falls less then the corresponding reaction in
the data. Unit labor costs (not shown in order to save space) react stronger than wages because of the
ﬁxed costs. They are therefore more in line with the empirical estimates than wages. Considering
the stylized structure of the model without capital and further features that would add additional
dynamics, the proximity of most responses to their empirical counterparts is quite satisfying. Note
that the model is able to deliver quantitative satisfying results without resorting to high markups
and/or a high labor supply elasticity, which Christiano et al. (1997) report as crucial for the empirical
success of a basic limited participation model.
Figure 4 plots the standard deviations of selected variables over the agents in the model after the same
shock as in the previous exercise. Again, the black line stands for ξn = 3, the red dashed-dotted
line for ξn = 4, and the blue dashed one for ξr = 3. As mentioned before, the increased dispersion
of money holdings, i.e., money withdrawn from the bank for shopping trips, is important in generat-
ing the fall in the markup. But since ﬁrms are visited sequentially, also the markup and output are
dispersed over ﬁrms, leading to quite large differences in the reaction of proﬁts. While the real wage
develops similar for all workers, hours worked differ toa larger extent. Theprediction of an increase in
the dispersion of prices after a monetary shock if empirically supported by Balke and Wynne (2007).
4.3 Sensitivity analysis
As discussed in the calibration section, the estimates for the intertemporal elasticity of substitution
(IES) and the Frisch elasticity of labor supply are estimated within broad ranges in the empirical liter-
ature. I therefore calculate the impulse-response functions for four different parameter constellations
in ﬁgure 5. The black lines reproduce the baseline calibration (σ = 3   = 0 65, i.e., IES=3, Frisch
elasticity=1/2), while the red dashed-dotted lines depict the case of σ = 3 and   = 0 38, correspond-
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Figure 5: Effects of different elasticities. Theoretical responses to an unanticipated expansionary
monetary policy shock at t=0. Black solid lines: baseline calibration. Red dashed-dotted lines: Frisch
elasticity=1/3. Blue dashed lines: σ=5. Green dashed-dotted lines: σ=2. Notes: Horizontal axis denotes
quarters, vertical axis shows log deviations from steady state.
ing to an IES and a Frisch elasticity of 1/3 each. The blue dashed lines plot the case of σ = 5 and
  = 0 71, implying an IES of 1/5 and a Frisch elasticity of 1/2. Finally, the green dashed-dotted lines
result from σ = 2 and   = 0 59, that is an IES and a Frisch elasticity of 1/2 each. As visible in the
picture, the model predicts very similar results for all considered cases.
I also explore the alternative distribution mechanism for the monetary injection described in section
2. Keeping the staggered bank visits of the agents but assuming that all agents beneﬁt from central
bank actions, i.e., the central bank transfers equal amounts of money on all accounts in the economy
(Si t = St n ∀ i), generates the impulse-response function in ﬁgure 6. I consider the same parameter
variations as in ﬁgure 5. Slightly hump-shaped responses for output, hours, and proﬁts emerge, in
line with the empirical evidence. Furthermore, velocity now falls on impact and then rises, also a
feature of the empirical impulse-response function in ﬁgure 3. On the other hand, most variables react
less than before. This is due to the reduced wealth effect. Since agents, who did not beneﬁt from a
monetary injection, know that a part of the monetary injection has been transferred to their accounts,
they expand labor supply less than in the baseline case. This is also visible in the response of hours
worked.
4.4 Business-cycle statistics
As an additional check concerning the empirical performance of the model, I compute its predictions
for several business-cycle statistics and compare them to the corresponding empirical moments in
table 1. The left column reports the second moments generated from time series, which would have
been observed if only monetary shocks had occurred, see section 3.3. In order to compare the model
with the data, I simulate the model 1000 times for the baseline case with ξn = 3 for 117 periods,
corresponding to the length of the empirical sample, with an additional initial 117 burn-in periods that
are then cut off. The resulting series are HP-ﬁltered with a smoothing parameter of 100, as the data in
17Output Inﬂation Proﬁts
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Figure 6: Theoretical responses to an unanticipated expansionary monetary policy shock at t=0 with
Si t=St n ∀ i. For description of different line colors see ﬁgure 5. Notes: Horizontal axis denotes
quarters, vertical axis shows log deviations from steady state.
section 3.3. Averages over the repetitions for the baseline calibration are reported in the right column
of table 1. I set the standard deviation of monetary shocks in the model such that the standard deviation
of the exogenous growth rate of the money stock is the same in the data and in the simulated model,
yielding a standard deviation of the percentage innovation to the money stock of  676. The table shows
that the model does well in some dimensions to explain business cycle ﬂuctuations. Concerning the
volatilities of output, inﬂation, and hours, the model is very close to the empirical counterparts. The
biggest failing is the underprediction of the volatility of the real wage. The standard deviations of
proﬁts, the interest rate, and velocity are also underpredicted, but to a lesser extent.
5 Conclusion
Considering the slow spreading of newly injected money and its effects on price setting and labor
supply in a model of segmented asset markets can replicate several empirical observations: 1) a
short-term inﬂation-output trade-off after a monetary injection, 2) quantitatively empirical plausible
impulse-response functions for output, inﬂation, hours worked, proﬁts, and velocity after monetary
injections, 3) a liquidity effect, 4) a countercyclical markup at the ﬁrm level after monetary shocks,
and 5) procyclical wages. Without labor market frictions, the impulse-response functions for most
variables are qualitatively in line with the evidence. The model generates a microfounded, internal
propagation mechanism which does not rely on capital or sticky prices, but on the slow spreading of
newly inserted money. This can be seen as a way of describing the effects of central bank actions,
where only parts of the population beneﬁt through ﬁrst-round effects, while others are affected
indirectly and later.
18As stated, after monetary shocks the optimal markup falls. Strategic complementarity is important in
this model. Each ﬁrm wants to maintain a higher markup, but would suffer too large a drop in sales if it
raised prices ﬁrst, because customers substitute away to other ﬁrms. As other ﬁrms slowly adjust their
prices, each ﬁrm can raise its price only gradually, thereby limiting price increases of competitors
and so on. This effect arises due to the sequential structure of the model. In discrete-time models
with symmetry assumptions on ﬁrms, this process of reacting to other ﬁrms’ price adjustments is
done instantaneously. Price setters calculate their own optimal price knowing that all ﬁrms are alike.
Hence, other ﬁrms’ price increases are completely anticipated before setting their own price, and
the new steady state is reached instantaneously. In the present model, ﬁrms do not increase prices
relying on the belief that all other ﬁrms will adjust at the same time. Instead, the probability of being
the only ﬁrm changing prices in a particular moment in time is one. Only if all ﬁrms adjust at the
same time will customers not have the possibility of substituting to a cheaper competitor, who did
not yet adjust. These insights into the role of coordination devices could be used to, e.g., study the
mechanisms present during the introduction of the Euro. Moreover, interesting welfare conclusions
emerge, since the central bank faces a trade-off between stabilizing policy and a considerable increase
in the consumption dispersion.
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21A Impulse-response functions for the basic setup
In order to demonstrate the basic mechanism of the model, ﬁgure A-1 shows the impulse-response
functions after an unanticipated monetary policy shock of 0 5% to the money supply at t=0 for the
simplest case, namely n=2, ﬂexible wages, and ρM =0. The remaining values are as in table 2. The
ﬁgure compares the baseline calibration of an intertemporal elasticity of substitution (1 σ) of 1/3 and
a Frisch elasticity of 1/2 (black solid lines) with the same variations as in section 4.3. In particular,
the cases of a Frisch elasticity of 1/3 (red dashed-dotted lines), σ = 5 (blue dashed lines), and σ = 2
(green dashed-dotted lines) with a Frisch elasticity of 1/2 are considered. The results are similar.
Except for proﬁts, the model does qualitatively well in reproducing the empirical impulse-response
functions of section 3. As in the empirical counterpart, velocity falls on impact. However, it fails to
rise above zero in subsequent periods. While the responses of the basic model are somewhat weak,
a combination with small nominal or real frictions delivers results that are also quantitatively in line
with empirical evidence. To this end, plausible values for nominal or real wage rigidity are employed
in section 4.
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Figure A-1: Theoretical responses to an unanticipated expansionary monetary policy shock at t=0
under ﬂexible wages for n=2. Black solid lines: σ=3, Frisch elasticity=1/2 (baseline calibration). Red
dashed-dotted lines: Frisch elasticity=1/3. Blue dashed lines: σ=5. Green dashed-dotted lines: σ=2.
Notes: Horizontal axis denotes quarters, vertical axis shows log deviations from steady state.
The workings of model, explained in more detail in section 4, are repeated here for convenience.
After the increase in the money stock, the distribution of money holdings is changed, which gives
rise to a falling markup. A lower markup prevents prices to move one-for-one with the money stock,
thereby increasing demand. In the basic case here, however, proﬁts fall due to a larger increase in the
real wage. They rise after a monetary injection for higher n or sticky wages. The agent who did not
receive the injection increases her labor supply because of a negative wealth effect stemming from
higher nominal prices, adding to the positive output response. These mechanisms generate a short-
term inﬂation-output trade-off. Over time, more and more agents beneﬁt from the initial injection
via higher wages, leading to long-lasting responses. The increased money supply depresses interest
rates because agents currently at the bank have to be induced to hold more money, creating a liquidity
effect.
22B Data sources
Data for section 3 are taken from the OECD Economic Outlook 84 in OECD (2008), OECD.Stat in
OECD (2009), and the Bureau of Labor Statistics. All data are for the United States, the time period
is as indicated in the main text with four additional quarters for the four lags of the VAR.
From the OECD Economic Outlook: ‘Gross domestic product - volume - market prices’, ‘Velocity
of money’, ‘Wage rate of the private sector’ divided by ‘Consumer price index’, ‘Private ﬁnal
consumption expenditure, deﬂator’, ‘Unit labor cost in total economy’ divided by ‘Consumer price
index’, ‘Hours worked per employee - total economy’.
From OECDStat: ‘Narrow Money (M1) Index 2005=100, SA’ and ‘Immediate interest rates, Call
Money, Interbank Rate, Per cent per annum’ (quarterly, i.e., mean of last month in quarter).
From the Bureau of Labor Statistics: ‘Measure: Hours Sector: Nonfarm Business, s.a. Series Id:
PRS85006033’.
From the Bureau of Economic Analysis: ‘Proﬁts before tax (without IVA and CCAdj) (nonﬁnancial
corporate business); Seasonally adjusted atannual rates’ from NIPATable1.14. divided by‘Consumer
Price Index’.
23